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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ZION'S PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah cor- I
poration,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
vs.
13922
FORREST C. HOLT, VIRGINIA W. HOLT,
GORDON C. HOLT, individually, and
GORDON C. HOLT, dba HOLT REALTY &
INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
TANDY LEATHER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
FORREST C. HOLT and VIRGINIA W.
HOLT, his wife, and ZION'S PROPERTIES,
INC., a corporation,
Defendants.

Case No.
13922

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Appellant,
Zion's Properties, Inc., against Defendants-Respondents,
Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W. Holt, to quiet title and
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enjoin Defendants from interfering with Appellant's
peaceful possession of the property located at 1101 and
1107 South State Street in Salt Lake City.
The action is based upon Section 78-40-1, et seq. of
the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, providing
that:
"An action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest in real property where an interest or
claim to personal property adverse to him for
the purpose of determining such adverse
claim."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment rendered in
a hearing below on Respondent's Motion to Strike Replies to Requests for Admissions, a determination that
Appellant is rightfully in possession of the property in
question, and an Order requiring Respondent's specific
performance under the Uniform Real Estate Contract
assigned from Great Southern, Inc., original purchaser,
to assignee, Zion's Properties, Inc., on July 18, 1973.
Tandy Leather Company joins in this action as a Plain
tiff-Respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Great Southern, Inc. purchased certain land with
the buildings and improvements thereon from Forrest
C. and Virginia W. Holt on a Uniform Real Estate Con-
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tract executed January 31, 1973 (a legal description of
the property is in Appellant's Complaint). All of Great
Southern's interest in the property was assigned to Zion's
Properties by an assignment executed July 18, 1973. At
the time Zion's Properties took full interest in the property under the assigned Uniform Real Estate Contract,
Defendant Forrest C. Holt had allowed to remain on said
property personal possessions which interfered with Plaintiff-Appellant's ability to lease the property and thereby
pay on the installment. Subsequently, Respondent and
Appellant orally agreed on December 8, 1973 to modify
the Contract to provide for payments in a lesser amount.
Thereafter, Appellant made payment in the amount
of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) on December 10, 1973,
under the terms of the Modification Agreement previously entered; and payment of One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00) on or about December 16, 1973 with the expressed provision that the Respondent's personal items
would be removed from the property.
On February 4,1974, Respondent mailed to Appellant
a Notice of Demand letter demanding payment within
five (5) days or Respondent would treat Appellant as
in default and rescind on the Contract. Payment in full
of the delinquent amount as determined by previous conversations and communications between Appellant and
Sterling G. Webber, agent for Respondent, was tendered
thereafter in the form of a cashier's check and made conditional upon Respondent's removing his property and
possessions from the warehouse on the subject property.
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Appellant tendered payment on four separate occasions. One tender occurred December 5, 1973 wherein
an oral promise to pay was made on condition that the
Respondent's property be removed from the warehouse
located on the subject property.
A second tender was made by telephone on or about
February 4, 1974. The same day Appellant tendered to
Respondent in Respondent's store the amount to bring
all delinquencies up to date. Respondent refused payment on any terms.
A third tender was made on or about February 19,
1974 to Mr. Sterling Webber, Respondent's agent, when
the stub of a cashier's check for the total delinquent
amount was displayed and tender offered upon condition
that Respondent remove his personal property from the
warehouse.
Finally, a fourth tender occurred on or about March
6, 1974 in Appellant's office to Mr. Sterling Webber, Respondent's agent, on expressed condition that Respondent's personal property be removed from the subject
property so that it could be leased.
Appellant served Respondent with a Complaint asking for appropriate relief on April 25, 1974. Respondent
filed an Answer and Counterclaim on May 8, 1974, reply
to which was returned July 15, 1974, Interrogatories and
further discovery continued until August, 1974, Respondents, by way of Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Strike Replies to Requests for Admissions,
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obtained a summary judgment on October 18, 1974 decreeing that Appellant had no right, interest or equity
in or to the property referred to due to forfeiture according to the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract
on the 10th day of Februay, 1974, denying Appellant's
requests by way of Complaint and awarding all rentals
subsequent to February 10, 1974 to Respondents.
This appeal is from that judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENT BECAUSE RESPONDENT WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SEEK RELIEF UNDER THE
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT BECAUSE RESPONDENT WAS VIOLATING
A DEPENDENT AND CONCURRENT CONDITION IN THE CONTRACT BY IMPAIRING APPELLANTS ABILITY TO PERFORM.
Respondent has continually refused to remove his
personal property from the warehouse located on the subject property. His failure to do so has prevented Appellant, as purchaser, from leasing the property in order to
receive rents which, in part, would go to make up the
installments which come due.
Such interference excuses Appellant's refusal to pay
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pursuant to the Contract. Davy vs. Olgier, 87 Cal. Rep.
2d, 198 P. 2d 92 (1948). In Davy, supra, the Court was
confronted with a specific performance action brought by
the purchaser. In discussing the rights and duties of the
parties to a land sales contract, the Court stated:
"Time, being of the essence, it was the duty of
Plaintiffs to see that Defendant was paid the
purchase price and the escrow closed within
thirty days, unless some action of the Defendant prevented the close of escrow/' Id. 96
(Emphasis added.)
Such holding is merely a restatement of the contractual
requirement that one seeking to enforce a contract must
do so with clean hands.
The tenders, discussed in Argument III, satisfied
the requirement upon Appellant to make payments. Vendor-Respondent has failed, in the instant case, to keep
the commitment of any vendor implied under law that
he render the subject matter of the contract fit for the
use it was intended. Similarly, in Hayward vs. Voorhees,
12 U. 2d 316, 366 P. 2d 977 (1961), a case concerning distribution of pasture land in probate the Court pointed out
that a vendor of land sold by contract could not unilaterally repudiate the contract.
The action by the Respondent herein amounts to an
unlimited repudiation because Appellant satisfied the
legal and contractual duty upon him to make payments
by making two payments under the oral modification and
tendering four others.
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In Marlowe Investment Company vs. Radmall, 26
U. 2d 134, 485 P. 2d 1402 (1971), the vendor's assignee
brought an action to recover payments accrued under a
Uniform Real Estate Contract. In holding against the
assignee, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Nevertheless, if it plainly appears that he
(vendor) has so lost or encumbered his ownership or his title that he will not be able to fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that the purchaser continue to make payments when it is
obvious his own performance will not be forthcoming." Ibid 1408.
If such a limitation is placed upon a vendor in an
anticipatory breach action, no less a burden is required
in the instant case where the vendor, at all times, could
have performed on the contract by merely removing his
property.
Other states are in accord. In Huggins vs. Green
Top Dairy Farms, Inc., 75 Idaho 436, 273 P. 2d 399
(1954), the Court was presented an action by the vendors
of the dairy against its purchaser seeking forfeiture of
the agreement for sale. The Court held for the purchaser
because the vendors, being materially in default on the
contract, could not enforce a forfeiture of it. The Court
stated:
"The Vendors of a dairy business, who had
failed to perform their part of the contract in
several particulars, were not in a position to
repudiate the entire contract and demand performance by the purchaser relative to payment
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for merchandise or other unliquidated sums."
Ibid at 406.
The Court thereupon cited as authority 12 Am. Jur.
959, Section 382, which cites that a party who positively
refuses to perform under his contract cannot sue another
for nonperformance, whether the promises are independent or not, if one is the consideration for the other and
the contract is wholly executory.
In the instant case, the consideration for payment
by the purchaser is possession of the property in question
without any encumbrances, encroachments or interference by the vendor. By nature, the contract is executory
because it is a Uniform Real Estate Contract and therefore, the purchaser acquires all incidents of ownership,
except legal title and is regarded in equity as owner of
the property while the vendor maintains legal title. Jelco,
Inc. vs. Third Judicial District Court, 29 U. 2d 472, 511
P. 2d 739 (1973).
Further cases are in accord and hold that until one
has offered to perform a mutually dependent condition,
he cannot place another party in default. Thein vs. Sticha,
93 Cal. App. 2d 295, 209 P. 2d 13 (1949); Lifton vs. Harshman, 80 Cal. App. 2d 422,182 P. 2d 222 (1947).
Further, in Barton vs. Baird, 163 Cal. App. 2d 502,
329 P. 2d 492 (1958), the Court stated:
" I n a contract for the sale of land where performance is due on a certain date, even if time
is of the essence, a party who fails to perform
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is not in default until the other party places
him in default by making a tender." Ibid 494.
In order for Respondent to prevail in this quiet title
action, he therefore must have placed the Appellant in
default by making a legally sufficient tender. The demand letter of February 4, 1974, does not qualify as such
a tender since a vendor must tender either title or not
interfere with the purchaser's quiet enjoyment of the
property. By interfering with Appellant's ability to lease
the property as the property's main use, Respondent
failed to tender all he was required to do under the contract. The tender must have been a demand when Respondent was performing as the law and the contract
provided.
To summarize, Respondent's action in failing to remove his property, thereby rendering the real estate in
question non-leaseable, impaired Appellant's ability to
perform under the contract. Under these circumstances,
after Appellant offered to pay the installments on four
occasions provided the property be removed, Appellant
was justified in withholding payment and bringing a quiet
title action and it should be so decreed.
The dilemma of the purchaser where he does not
desire to repudiate the contract but wants specific performance by the vendor and cannot afford to continue
the contract, has been pointed out in many cases. In
McFadden vs. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P. 2d 1353
(1971), the Court again, addressed this situation and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
held that a wilfully defaulting vendee may secure specific
performance of a land sales contract.
Appellant's request for specific performance should,
therefore, be granted regardless of the actions of Respondent; however, where Respondent has wilfully impaired
Appellant's ability to perform under the contract, Respondent is not in the position to default the Appellant
purchaser. Leavitt vs. Blohm, 11 U. 2d 220, 357 P. 2d
199 (1960); Marlowe Investment Company vs. Radmatt,
26 U. 2d 134, 485 P. 2d 1402 (1971); Hayward vs. Voorhees, 12 U. 2d 316, 366 P. 2d 977 (1961).
The Court outlined the basic requirements upon a
vendor or a purchaser, before either may enforce the land
sales contract in Leavitt, supra. That case involved an
assignee who treated a contract as abandoned and therafter complained for restoration of her payments. The
Court stated:
" A purchaser who fails to make his payments
cannot enforce his rights, and a vendor who
fails to meet his commitment cannot expect the
purchaser to perform." Ibid at 193.
Appellant herein made four valid tenders of payment
to Respondent who failed to meet his commitment and
rendecned the property fit for the use it was intended.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESTITUTION TO RESPONDENT
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AND BY NOT DECREEING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ON THE ORAL CONTRACT
DUE TO THE PARTIAL PERFORMANCE
BY THE APPELLANT.
The general requirement of the Statute of Frauds
is that a writing is required for enforceability of any contract transferring any interest in land. Simpson on Contracts, 2nd Edition, Section 77, Page 153. This general
rule was codified in Utah under Section 25-5-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1053 which provides in part:
"No estate or interest in real property . . . shall
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of
law or by deed or conveyance in writing described by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same."
Appellant and Respondent orally agreed to payments
of a lesser amount on December 8, 1973. Payment was
thereafter made by check drawn December 10, 1973 in
the amount of $500.00. Noted upon the check are the
words "As per agreement 12-8-73". Respondent cashed
the check and failed to complain about the notation. The
check thereby became a memorandum, a writing, within
the scope of the Statute of Frauds. The agreement is
clear and performance is in accord. The contract of January 31, 1973 thereby became modified in that, until Respondent's personal property was removed from the warehouse, the lower payments would suffice.
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Nevertheless, it is also a general rule that courts will
order specific performance of an oral land contract regardless of the State of Frauds where (1) there has been
part performance in reliance on the oral contract, (2)
said performance occurred because of the oral contract,
and (3) the remedy of claimant for the value of the part
performance is so inadequate that a denial of enforcement
would defraud the party performing. Simpson, supra,
Section 79, Page 157,
The Utah legislature has additionally adopted this
provision allowing the courts to enforce this exception to
the Statute of Frauds in Section 25-5-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Such section provides that "nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to abridge the powers of
courts to compel the specific performance of agreements
in case of part performance".
This Court recognizes the doctrine of part performance as an exception to the Statute of Frauds. Price vs.
Lloyd, 31 U. 86, 86 P. 2d 67 (1906). The Court in Price,
supra, stated:
"Courts in equity, in establishing the doctrine
of part performance, have not, by any means,
intended to annul the Statute of Frauds but
only to prevent its being made the means of
perpetuating fraud. I n order that a plaintiff be
permitted to give evidence of the contract not
in writing, and which is in the very teeth of
the statute and anulity at law, it is essential
that he establish, by clear and positive proof,
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exclusively referrable thereto and which take
it out of the operation of the statute."
In the case In Re Madsen's Estate, (Utah, 1953)
259 P. 2d 595, the Court stated: *
"Part performance which will avoid Statute of
Frauds may consist of any act which puts party
performing in such position that nonperformance by the other would constitute a fraud."
Ibid 601.
In Ravarino vs. Price, (Utah, 1953) 260 P. 2d 570,
the Court stated that where possession is relied upon,
"it must be of such nature that it would not have been
given without the presence of an oral contract to convey".
This Court has dealt with the types of acts that will
satisfy the exception of part performance. In Randall
vs. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 6 U. 2d 18, 305 P. 2d
480 (1956), the Court outlined three general criteria, excepting an oral contract from the Statute:
"First, the oral contract and its terms must be
clear and definite; second, the acts done in performance of the contract must be equally clear
and definite; and third, the acts must be in
reliance on the contract."
Simpson, supra, Section 79, Page 158, indicates possession coupled with valuable and permanent improvements is considered the strongest and most unequivocable
act of part performance. But there are other acts which
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satisfy the criteria set forth by the Court to Randall,
supra. The instant agreement for lesser payments, evidenced by writing, is clear and definite, the payments
made are clear and definite and are in reliance upon the
agreement.
The premise of the doctrine of part performance is
that it would be a fraud upon the purchaser if the vendor
were permitted to escape the performance of his part
of the oral agreement after he has permitted the purchaser to perform in reliance upon the agreement. In 49
Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds, Section 421, Pages 725
through 726, the following provision is found:
"The oral contract is enforced in harmony with
the principal that courts of equity will not allow the Statute of Frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud. I n other words, the doctrine
of part performance was established for the
same purpose which the Statute of Frauds itself was enacted; namely, for the prevention
of fraud, and arose from the necessity of preventing the Statute from becoming an agent
of fraud, for it could not have been the intention of the Statute to enable any party to commit fraud with impunity." Ibid at 725.
The elements required to make the doctrine of part
performance applicable are satisfied in the instant case.
First, the acts relied upon changed Appellant's position
resulting in fraud, injustice or hardship if the contract
is not enforced. 49 Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds, Section
427. Second, the part performance of Appellant is preju-
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dicial to him and places him in a situation which will not
result in compensation and which situation he would
have avoided had there been no contract. 49 Am. Jur.
Supra, Section 734. Third, there need not be payment
by Appellant where it appears that he had good reason
for not making said payment. 49 Am. Jur. Supra, Section
435. Fourth, the change of position made by Appellant
was made with knowledge and consent of acquiescence
of the vendor-Respondent. 49 Am. Jur. Supra, Section
451.
Appellant submits that be performed in accordance
with the oral agreement;, which is evidenced by the written Memorandum, by making definite payments of
$500.00 on December 10, 1973, and $1,000.00 on or about
December 16, 1973. When it became clear that Respondent refused to remove his personal property, which was
injuring Appellant's use of the property subject to the
contract, Appellant tendered full payment four times on
condition that the property of Respondent be removed.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESTITUTION TO RESPONDENT BECAUSE RESPONDENT REFUSED TO ACCEPT A VALID TENDER ON FOUR SEPARATE OCCASIONS, BY WHICH RESPONDENT PLACED HIMSELF IN A POSITION
WHERE HE COULD NOT ENFORCE THE
CONTRACT,
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Tender of payment in a Real Estate Contract case
is an exception to the general rule that a tender must
include actual physical offering of the payment. Tender
of mutual and concurrent promises in a contract for the
sale of real property is mere readiness, willingness and
ability to perform all the required obligations provided
the other party will do the things concurrently required.
Katemis vs. Westerlind, 120 Cal. App. 537, 261 P. 2d 553
(1953). The Court, in Katemis, supra, rules such in an
action granting specific performance of the damages for
breach of contract for the sale of realty. The Court further stated:
" A party to a contract cannot require the other
party thereto to perform his part of the agreement unless the party demanding such performance has fulfilled all conditions precedent
imposed upon him and is able to and has offered
to fulfill all the conditions concurrent imposed
upon him."
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the same
issue in Home Owner's Loan Corporation vs. Washington,
108 U. 469,161 P. 2d 355 (1945). In describing the effect
of legally sufficient tender upon a contract, the Court
said:
"Under a contract which provides that any default in the payment of the interest of an installment of the principal when due shall give
the obligee an option to declare the whole
amount due, the general rule is that a tender
of payment of the overdue principal or interest
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before the option to declare the whole debt
due has been exercised, cuts off the rights of
exercise of the option. This is so because the
debt does not become due on the mere default in
payment, but by affirmative action by which
the creditor makes it known to the debtor that
he intends to declare the whole debt due." Ibid
at 357.
This view was again re-emphasdzed by the Court in
Romero vs. Schmidt, 15 U. 2d 300, 392 P. 2d 37 (1964),
wheare an act of telephoning and offer was considered
sufficient tender when the tender or otherwise would be
a meaningless gesture.
Respondent demanded payment of $11,073.27 on
February 4, 1974. Respondent's agent, Sterling Webber,
thereafter agreed that the sum demanded was excessive
and the lesser amount tendered by Appellant was more
appropriate. Such lesser amount was tendered twice
in February.
The Court, in Huggins, supra, further pointed out
that when a vendor demands more than he is entitled,
the purchaser is justified in not tendering the total
amount due.
After the conversation of February 4, 1974, at Respondent's store wherein Respondent refused valid tender
because his brother told him to "not receive payment
because he could get the property back if he refused
payment at this time", Respondent made it dear that
any further tenders would be meaningless gestures. Such
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action on the part of Respondent rendered this second
tender and all subsequent tenders legally sufficient because they qualified as meaningless gestures, as in Thomas
vs. Johnson, 55 U. 424, 186 P. 437 (1919); Evans, et al.
vs. Houtz, 57 U. 216, 193 P. 858 (1950).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests this
Court to reverse the judgment and findings of the court
below; and in the alternative, to remand for new trial
consistent with the rulings of this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS, INC.
By
Lowell V. Surnmerhays
Attorney for Appellant
1010 UnivemLty Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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